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This paper introduces the ﬁrst effort to quantitatively document the small arms market by 
collating ﬁeld reports and journalist accounts to produce a cross-country time-series price index 
of Kalashnikov assault riﬂes. A model of the small arms market is developed and empirically 
estimated to identify the key determinants of assault rifle prices. Variables which proxy the 
effective height of trade barriers for illicit trade are consistently signiﬁcant in determining 
weapon price variation. When controlling for other factors, the collapse of the Soviet Union does 
not have as large an impact on weapon prices as is generally believed. 
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Small arms are estimated to be responsible for between 200,000 - 400,000 deaths around the 
world each year. Approximately 20,000 – 100,000 of these firearm deaths occur in conﬂict 
settings (Small Arms Survey 2005, Kopel, Gallant and Eisen 2004, and Lacina and Gleditsch 
2005). As economic commodities, firearms are subject to the forces of demand and supply and 
are actively traded on legal and illicit markets. The small arms market may be viewed as a 
function of the incentives and constraints faced by buyers, suppliers and regulators. This paper 
introduces cross-country, time-series data on assault rifle prices thus making it possible to 
quantitatively examine the nature of the small arms market. 
 
Small arms are attractive tools of violence for several reasons. They 
are widely available, low in cost, extremely lethal, simple to use, 
durable, highly portable, easily concealed, and possess legitimate 
military, police, and civilian uses. As a result they are present in 
virtually every society. (Boutwell and Klare 1999) 
 
Despite being a key component in conﬂict, small arms have only recently begun to receive 
academic attention. So far research has been almost exclusively case-study driven making it 
difficult to draw general empirical lessons. Book length treatments of small arms which follow 
this trend include Boutwell and Klare (1999) and Lumpe (2002). Brauer (2007) surveys the small 
arms literature in the forthcoming Handbook of Defense Economics and concludes that the small 
arms market has not been well examined theoretically, or empirically. The ﬁrst tentative steps 
towards generalizable models of the small arms market are currently underway. Brauer and 
Muggah (2006) develop a conceptual theory of small arms demand as a function of means and 
motivation, an adaptation of the standard determinants (income, prices and preferences) of 
neoclassical consumer demand theory (Varian 1992). 
 
On the supply side, Marsh (2007) develops a conceptual model for the illicit acquisition of small 
arms by rebel groups. Among other hypotheses, Marsh’s model predicts that the more liquid is   3
the arms supply in a particular country, i.e. the more easily individual combatants can obtain 
weapons through independent suppliers, the more difficult it will be to mount and maintain a 
united and coordinated insurgency.  
 
There are a number of reasons why small arms have been all but ignored in the quantitative 
analysis of conflict. The historic state-centric bias of defense economics led to an almost 
exclusive focus on inter-state military strategy. In relation to military weapons, research has 
principally been concerned with the development and acquisition of large-scale military 
technology, such as nuclear weapons. Perhaps the most important reason for the dearth of 
attention given to the role of weapons in civil war is that usable data have been unavailable. The 
policy research community, led by the Small Arms Survey (SAS), the UN’s Small Arms and 
Demobilisation Unit, the Bonn International Center for Conversion, and the Norwegian Initiative 
on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), has produced a great deal of survey and case-study work. 





Existing data on aspects of the small arms market are extremely limited. Since 2001, the Small 
Arms Survey has gathered a range of information on small arms products, stockpiles, producers 
and trade. Despite occasional references to observed prices, the Survey has not regularly 
collected price data which would be of most beneﬁt for generating inferential statistics.  
 
Collecting price data for panel analysis requires an operational deﬁnition of the variable of 
interest that will provide consistency across time and countries. In the case of small arms there is 
an obvious choice: the AK-47 assault riﬂe. Of the estimated 500 million ﬁrearms worldwide, 
approximately 100 million belong to the Kalashnikov family, three-quarters of which are AK-
47s (Small Arms Survey 2004). 
 
The pervasiveness of this weapon may be explained in large part by its simplicity. The AK-47 
was initially designed for ease of operation and repair by glove-wearing Soviet soldiers in arctic   4
conditions. Its breathtaking simplicity means that it can also be operated by child soldiers in the 
African desert. Kalashnikovs are a weapon of choice for armed forces and non-state actors alike. 
They are to be found in the arsenals of armed and special forces of more than 80 countries. In 
practically every theatre of insurgency or guerrilla combat a Kalashnikov will be found. The 
popularity of the AK-47 is accentuated by the view that it was a necessary tool to remove 
colonial rulers in Africa and Asia. Indeed, an image of the riﬂe appears on the Mozambique 
national ﬂag, and “Kalash”, an abbreviation of Kalashnikov, is a common boy’s name in some 
African countries. 
 
The AK-47’s popularity is generally attributed to its functional characteristics; ease of operation, 
robustness to mistreatment and negligible failure rate. The weapon’s weaknesses - it is 
considerably less accurate, less safe for users, and has a smaller range than equivalently 
calibrated weapons - are usually overlooked, or considered to be less important than the beneﬁts 
of its simplicity. But other assault riﬂes are approximately as simple to manage, yet they have not 
experienced the soaring popularity of the Kalashnikov. 
 
The AK-47’s ubiquity could alternatively be explained as a result of a path dependent process. 
Economic historians recognize that an inferior product may persist when a small but early 
advantage becomes large over time and builds up a legacy that makes switching costly (David 
1975). In the case of the AK-47 that early advantage may be that as a Soviet invention it was not 
subject to patent and so could be freely copied. Furthermore, large caches of these weapons were 
freely distributed to regimes and rebels sympathetic to the Soviet Union - more freely, that is, 
than weapons were distributed by the US - thereby giving the AK-47 a foothold advantage in the 
emerging post-World War II market for small arms. 
 
According to a path dependence interpretation, inferior durable capital equipment may remain in 
use because the ﬁxed costs are already sunk, while variable costs (e.g. ammunition, learning 
costs for new recruits) are lower than the total costs of replacing Kalashnikovs with a new 
generation of weapons of apparently superior quality. Whatever the exact causes, it remains that 
for the last half-century the AK-47 has enjoyed a near dominant role in the market for assault 
riﬂes making it the most persistent piece of modern military technology.  Since the technology   5
used in the AK-47 is essentially unchanged from the original, one may be conﬁdent that the 
prices observed across time and countries are determined market conditions rather than changes 




The weapon price data are compiled from a range of journalistic reports and industry interviews. 
The unit of analysis is the price in $US for each country for each five-year period for a non-
government entity to take possession of an AK-47 assault riﬂe. The foundation of the dataset was 
generated with the assistance of the Small Arms Black Market Archive, maintained by the 
Norwegian Institute for Small Arms Transfers (NISAT 2006). The Archive contains over 9,000 
documents relating to illicit small arms trade. Articles with references to quoted prices or 
reported transactions involving AK-47 or equivalent assault riﬂes were extracted and the 
information converted into the data format using the coding rules outlined in Appendix A.  
 
References to assault riﬂe prices were extracted from the back editions of the Small Arms 
Survey, which have been obtained on an ad hoc basis from ﬁeld work. The dataset also beneﬁted 
from interviews with arms industry experts who have had considerable experience with arms 
bazaars throughout Africa and Asia. Of particular note is Brian Thomas, an investigative 
journalist, who has been following the illicit arms trade from factory-to-ﬁght for the last 15 years 
and has assiduously recorded the going prices for assault riﬂes in a range of locations at different 
times. The frequency distribution of data sources for price observations is as follows: NISAT 
Small Arms Black Market Archive (58%); Small Arms Survey (17%); US Alcohol Tobacco and 
Firearms Authority (16%); Brian Thomas (6%); other sources (3%). 
 
Summary of Kalashnikov Price Data 
 
This section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the data, and presents descriptive 
summary statistics. The major strengths of the data include the broad coverage of countries for 
which at least one data point was obtained (117); a consistent operational deﬁnition of the price 
variable across time and countries; collection of multiple country-period observations to verify   6
that data is of the correct order of magnitude. Furthermore, the AK-47 price variable may be 
considered a strong proxy for the price of conﬂict-speciﬁc capital. 
 
A potential weakness of the data relates to the randomness of the sample collected. The time 
dimension suffers from a temporal selection bias. There are relatively more observations for 
more recent periods. For the period 1986 to 1990 there are 46 unique country observations, 
whereas for 2001 to 2005 there are 101. This is most likely a due to the combination of more 
thorough information dissemination facilitated by the internet and the recent increase in attention 
given to the small arms trade. 
 
The country dimension potentially involves a nonrandom sample as there are relatively more 
weapon price observations for low-income countries which have experienced civil war compared 
with peaceful low-income countries. Small arms will tend to be more actively traded in or near 
war-affected countries. A concern is that journalistic accounts may exaggerate or only report 
extreme prices. One would expect such measurement error to be biased downwards in poor or 
war-affected countries. Adherence to the coding rules above generally precludes extreme or 
outlier data points as they do not conform to the deﬁnition which is used to provide a consistent 




The dataset potentially contains i = 208 countries over t = 4 time periods. The 208 countries are 
those for which the World Bank collects data for the World Development Indicators (WDI) data 
base. Subtracting data points for those countries which did not exist due to achieving 
independence later than 1986 leaves 742 potential observations. As shown in Table I there are 
335 independent country-period data points for weapon prices. Coverage for just under half of all 
potential data points would suggest sufficient coverage for purposes of inferential statistics. 
 
In addition to a temporal selection bias towards the present, there are comparatively more 
observations for Africa and the Middle East, and fewer in Western Europe. The low rate of 
observation in Western Europe (12 observations in the whole sample) may give rise to sample   7
selection effects which must be addressed in the future. One possible method to overcome this 
would be to impute AK-47 prices from the prices of competing, equivalent assault riﬂes. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 track the movement of average weapon prices for regions, and for countries with 
civil conﬂict experience. What can be seen is that in peaceful and developed countries weapon 
prices have been rising. In conﬂict-affected countries prices has remained roughly constant while 
in Africa prices have in fact been trending down. A country is deemed conﬂict-affected if it has 
experienced a civil war in the last 20 years. 
 
THE SMALL ARMS MARKET 
 
This section develops a model of the small arms market based on a simultaneous equations 
model of demand and supply. Demand for small arms depends on their relative price (P), income 
(I) and the motivation for owning a weapon (M). The supply side of the small arms market is 
determined by price (P), the prevailing regulations in relation to small arms (R), and intrinsic 
supply costs (S). The structural demand and supply equations of this simultaneous equation 
system are given by: 
 
  Qd = -a - bP + cI + dM  (1) 
 
  Qs = e + fP - gR - hS (2) 
 
Setting (1) equal to (2) for an equilibrium: 
 
  Qs = Qd  (3) 
 
  e + fP - gR - hS = -a - bP + cI + dM (4) 
 
 
Solving these equilibrium conditions for the endogenous dependent variables price (P) and 
quantity (Q) yields the following reduced form equations:   8
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Since we do not currently have country estimates for the quantity of Kalashnikov trades (Qi), it is 
not possible to estimate both reduced form equations. Hence the structural parameters (a... g) 
from equations 1 and 2 cannot be empirically estimated. With the beneﬁt of the collected weapon 
price data we can nevertheless estimate the reduced form equation for weapon price. While the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the reduced form equations should not be interpreted 
in the normal linear fashion, their signs and signiﬁcance can provide meaningful insight into the 
nature of the small arms market. In order to estimate the reduced form price equation, it is 
necessary to obtain data for variables which proxy the desired concepts (Income (I), Motivation 
(M), Regulation (R), Supply costs (S)). Table III outlines the empirically observed variables 
which will be used to estimate the reduced form price equation. 
 
A four-period (20 year) cross-country panel is used to estimate the reduced form model for 
weapon price determinants: 
 
  it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it it P  =   +  I  +  M  +  R  +  S  + e β ββ β β  (7) 
 
The estimation method used is random effects generalized least squares (GLS). The random 
effects approach is appropriate where there is reason to believe that some omitted variables may 
be constant over time but vary between cases (e.g. geography) which could be managed with a 
ﬁxed effects estimator, while other omitted variables others may be ﬁxed between cases but vary 
over time (e.g. illicit supply sources) and would be best served by a between estimator. It is 
possible to include both types using the random effects estimator which is a weighted average of 
ﬁxed and between effects estimators (Wooldridge 2002). In order to determine whether random 
effects provides a consistent estimator, we run a Hausman test against the less efficient but   9
assuredly consistent ﬁxed effects model. The Hausman test for the basic model (column 1 in 
Table IVa) yields an insigniﬁcant ρ-value (0.26) for the null hypothesis that random effects is 




Table IVa and Table IVb present regressions based on the reduced form weapon price 
determinants model (Equation 7) for the global sample of weapon prices. Column 1 begins with 
a single variable for each concept (income, motivation, regulation and supply costs). Subsequent 





It is expected that the higher is per capita income (I) the higher will be weapon prices, due to the 
partial non-tradability of weapons from official trade barriers. Results from alternative variations 
of the model only weakly support this hypothesis. According to competitive international trade 
models, free trade will equalize commodity prices. However, non-government weapons trade 
between countries is almost always contraband. To the extent that laws prohibiting weapons 
trade are enforced, weapons will take on the attributes of non-tradable goods. The price of this 
class of good is determined by domestic factor prices, most importantly labor, and labor costs 
will in general be larger the higher is income. 
 
Due to the partial non-tradability of weapons, the theoretically appropriate measure of income is 
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Other measures of income also ﬁnd a 
positive relationship between income and weapon price. However, variables which measure 
income in nominal or absolute terms are more strongly subject to income’s correlation with 
governance variables. One might expect causation to ﬂow from income to governance: the higher 
is income the more tax governments have at their disposal to spend on effective regulation and 
law enforcement. But available evidence suggests that the causal impact of income on 
governance is negligible, and causation is more robustly demonstrated to operate in the opposite   10
direction (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005). When the PPP measure of income was 
replaced with income in constant US$, the regulatory variable R (government effectiveness) was 
rendered insigniﬁcant. The PPP income measure is less susceptible to correlation with 
governance indicators and can be more conﬁdently interpreted as the wealth mark-up on weapon 




Obtaining a satisfactory proxy for the motivation (M) to purchase assault riﬂes is a difficult task. 
In the ﬁrst instance, income growth is adopted as a measure for the desire to buy weapons. 
Negative income growth has been found to increase the proneness of a country to civil war 
outbreak (Collier and Hoefﬂer 2004), even when accounting for the endogeneity of economic 
growth in the conﬂict process (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004). It is also found to increase 
the incidence of violent crime (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza 2002). Therefore, we would 
expect negative income shocks to lead to an increased motivation to purchase weapons for the 
purposes of crime or conﬂict. 
 
In the estimated model, the coefficient on lagged income growth is not statistically different from 
zero (columns 1 and 2). The inconclusiveness of this parameter estimate may be the result of 
competing effects in the small arms market during economic downturns. While one expects the 
demand for weapons (for crime and conﬂict) to drive weapon prices up, it is conceivable that 
there is an even stronger supply effect. Agents on the margin of the legal labor market become 
unemployed in an economic downturn and a fraction of those unemployed take on employment 
in the black market (including the arms trade), which is proﬁtable relative to no work at all. The 
extra (illicit) employment in arms trade creates a more competitive arms market and the increase 
in supply may offset the increase in demand.  Since the results for lagged income growth are 
insigniﬁcant it is not possible to determine whether the supply or demand effect dominates. A 
rationalization for the observed parameter estimate of zero is that the illicit weapons market 
adapts well to changes in economic conditions so that the effect of economic shocks on weapon 
price is neutralized. 
   11
Another hypothesized driver of the motivation to purchase assault rifles is civil conflict, the 
setting where such weapons are mostly likely to be used for their intended purpose. An indicator 
variable for civil war onset is included to proxy demand for weapons for rebellion. The war start 
variable is coded one if in a five-year period a civil conflict claims at least 25 deaths in a given 
year.  While the parameter estimate was positive it was insignificant  (column 10 in Table IVb) 
so it is not possible to conclude that on average there is a significant demand side effect on 
weapon prices during the period of conflict onset. The result was similar for the 1,000 battle 
death threshold. 
 
A range of other variables were additionally tested in an effort to capture the motivation to 
purchase weapons. The proportion of young men (the demographic group most likely to 
purchase weapons); the proportion of young men interacted with income growth, and schooling 
(it is hypothesized that uneducated young men and those who experience negative income 
shocks are prime candidates for seeking weapons); ﬁnally, the average rate of homicide as an 
approximate measure for the underlying proclivity towards violence in a country was tested. All 
of these measures for motivation proved insigniﬁcant in explaining weapon price. This is not to 
conclude that motivation is unimportant in determining weapon price. Rather, it may indicate 
that better measures of preferences for purchasing weapons are required, and that decomposing 
motivation effects is not something that can be achieved in the basic framework currently under 
analysis, especially as the parameter estimates are for the reduced form, not the structural 
demand and supply equations. An alternative explanation for the insignificance of demand side 
variables is that the price elasticity of supply is very large relative to the price elasticity of 




Almost all countries have legislation designed to control the trade and possession of small arms. 
What differs is the ability of governments to enforce these laws. We expect that the more 
effective a government is at upholding its law, the greater will be the cost to trade weapons, legal 
or otherwise. The regulatory variable (R) is intended to capture the height of the trade barriers 
that must be overcome in order to sell a weapon.   12
 
A number of measures of regulatory effectiveness  are used and all indicate that better 
enforceability of laws and regulations raises the price of weapons. The World Bank’s 
government effectiveness variable which measures the competence of the bureaucracy is 
everywhere positive and signiﬁcant. Data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG 
2005) conﬁrms the importance of regulatory capacity as a determinant of weapon price. 
Democratic accountability measures are signiﬁcant suggesting that checks on different levels of 
government and public services are also important in enforcing law in relation to illicit weapons 
(column 7). 
 
The ICRG law and order variable is intended to proxy the on-the-ground ability of police to 
enforce the law and prosecute weapons violations. The parameter estimate is positive, but less 
convincing than expected (column 8). This may be explained by a demand-effect at very low 
levels of law and order. Households and groups are acutely aware when internal security forces 
are ineffective and may attempt to ﬁll a security vacuum with their own weapons acquisition, 
whether for self-defense, crime or conﬂict. The lesser signiﬁcance of the ICRG variables may be 
due to their reduced coverage relative to the World Bank’s variables. As a check for whether the 
effect of varying sample sizes are signiﬁcant, regressions were run with the World Bank 
governance data on the sample for which there was ICRG data. The results were not signiﬁcantly 
different in the smaller samples. 
 
The variables used to proxy regulatory effectiveness (R) are all ordinal indicators. Since these 
variables are not cardinal, the effect of a change from, for example, -1 to 0 is not necessarily 
commensurate with an improvement from 0 to +1. As such, the parameter estimates cannot be 
interpreted in the standard linear fashion. In order to verify that the ordinal dimension of these 
variables is not biasing estimation, segments of the governance variables are pooled together. 
Dummy variables for each third of the government effectiveness distribution are generated and 
included in the weapon price regression. In the ﬁrst instance, the bottom third of countries is 
included, and the Africa dummy is excluded . The bottom third governance indicator variable is 
independently signiﬁcant (column 12), but when Africa is again included (column 14) the Africa 
dummy maintains its signiﬁcance and yields a similar parameter estimate, while the segmented   13
governance dummy becomes somewhat less signiﬁcant (ρ = 0.12). This procedure was also 
undertaken for the 20th and 25th percentile segments of the distribution with similar results. 
Since the remaining parameters are not affected by respeciﬁcation, it may be concluded that the 
ordinal properties of the governance variables do not systematically bias the estimates. 
 
The regulatory effectiveness variable is concerned with the effective height of the trade barriers 
that need to be overcome in order to trade a Kalashnikov. The empirical governance variables 
considered so far account for the relative freedom of within-country trade. Arguably, however, 
between-country trade barriers are at least as important as within-country barriers. The ideal 
variable would be some measure of the porousness of a country’s border since the vast majority 
of cross-border small arms transactions are likely to be illicit. Since no such data currently exist 
it is proposed to use a dummy variable for African countries. Africa provides a natural 
experiment because its countries on average possess a higher number of neighbors than the rest 
of the world (3.4 versus 2.1), that are considered to have more porous borders than the rest of the 
world (CIA 2005). 
 
Even controlling for income, government effectiveness, war legacy and supply cost variables, 
being located in an African country makes purchasing an assault riﬂe on average over US$200 
cheaper than elsewhere. It is postulated that this staggering Africa-discount is predominantly 
driven by porous borders. Since borders are more porous than elsewhere, the trade in assault 
riﬂes across the African continent approaches a deregulated market in which prices converge and 
there are only negligible trade barriers that arms supply must overcome to meet demand. At any 
one time, only a few African countries have very high demand for weapons due to conflict. This 
demand proﬁle across the continent changes over time as localized tensions rise and recede. 
Porous borders enable the entire supply of weapons on the African continent to meet whichever 
country currently has high weapons demand. 
   14
Supply Costs 
 
The supply costs variable (S) in the small arms market model is designed to capture the intrinsic 
non-regulatory costs involved with supplying arms. A range of empirical variables are used to 
represent the key factors that affect the underlying cost of supplying assault riﬂes. The supply 
cost variable that proves most robust is neighbors’ average military expenditure. This variable 
measures the average of neighboring countries’ annual government military expenditure as a 
share of GDP. It is theorized that the strong negative correlation between neighbors’ military 
expenditure and weapon price is driven by spillovers and leakages. Spillovers arise where some 
fraction of a country’s military spending is allocated to supplying arms directly to anti-
government forces in rival neighboring countries. The exact reasons for governments supplying 
foreign rebel forces with arms are not considered here, but one may conjecture that such supply 
involves some strategic decision designed to destabilize or divert the attention of a threatening 
neighbor’s regime. The leakage effect arises not from a conscious effort by neighbors, but from 
misappropriation of official weapons stocks by arms dealers and rebels. Such acquisition is 
typically facilitated by unauthorized sales by defense force personnel (i.e. corruption) or the 
forcible seizure of weapons stocks during combat or raids on arsenals, which are then sold across 
borders. 
 
Surprisingly, own-country military expenditure was not a satisfactory explanator of weapon 
price. Indeed, it had the opposite sign to neighbors’ military expenditure (column 9). An 
explanation for this result is that most illicit purchases of weapons will not be from officials to 
non-government agents of the same nationality. In general, defense forces would not wish to 
destabilize their own regime by facilitating arms trade with domestic rebels. Even at lower levels 
within the military, the private incentives of soldiers making some extra money from 
unauthorized sales to domestic rebels is likely to be outweighed by the expected cost of being 
caught and dealt corporal or capital punishment. Moreover, there is a deterrent effect of own 
military expenditure on the feasibility of weapons trade. Where a country has a strong military 
presence (as proxied by a high level of military expenditure), it would be imprudent for non-
government entities to openly trade or parade about with large quantities 
of conﬂict-grade weapons.   15
 
The supply cost variable that seeks to proxy the stock of weapons in circulation is a variable 
called civil war legacy. The legacy variable is generated using the cumulative civil war battle-
deaths since 1960. Since the majority of battle deaths are caused by weapons, the number of 
battle deaths may be considered a suitable proxy for the quantity of active weapons in a country. 
In the same way as the magnitude of a war 30 years ago matters proportionately less than an 
equivalent-sized battle last year, the weapons used to prosecute the war depreciate over time. A 
discount rate of 5% is applied to recognize depreciation, consistent with a Kalashnikov’s life 
expectancy of up to 50 years. As an approximation of the number of active weapons, the legacy 
variable is reasonably robust to various model speciﬁcations. Its parameter estimate is negative 
signiﬁcant conforming with elementary price theory which predicts that, all else equal, the more 
plentiful is a commodity, the cheaper it will be. To the extent that the legacy variable provides a 
proxy for the stocks of non-government weapons, it also illustrates why weapon supply is 
considerably more elastic than demand. According to the basic theory of price elasticity of 
supply where there are higher stocks, supply agents (weapons traders, rebel groups) will be able 
to respond to changes in demand relatively more quickly and hence supply will be relatively 
more elastic. 
 
It is commonly believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union released inestimable stocks of 
weapons onto the world market. This view has been popularized in a recent Hollywood ﬁlm, 
Lord of War, where Nicholas Cage plays a Ukrainian arms dealer who proﬁtably liquidates the 
former Soviet state’s military arsenal. According to conventional wisdom, weapons trade during 
the Cold War was based on political affiliation, but since the collapse of communism it has been 
driven by proﬁt-seekers. Another way of conceiving this hypothesized transition is in terms of 
industrial organization: until 1991 there was a duopoly in the weapons market (USA and USSR). 
Since then the global market has been effectively deregulated with numerous agents operating in 
a competitive market. 
 
Was the collapse of the Soviet Union a signiﬁcant supply shock for the illicit weapons market? 
Regression results suggest not. At the very least, it is not as important as previously believed. 
When controlling for other factors, the coefficient on the dummy for the post-Soviet collapse   16
period is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels (column 6). This result suggests that the historical 
case for a structural break in the global market for small arms has been overstated. An 
explanation for this ﬁnding is to be found in the role of secondary markets. Since weapons are 
durable goods they can, like shares in a ﬁrm, be repeatedly sold from agent to agent. During the 
Cold War, even though the superpowers thought they were giving or selling weapons to their 
political allies, these weapons were regularly - and proﬁtably - sold on to secondary (or black) 
markets which had no regard for the political stripe of the initial source of the weapon. Two 
caveats to this ﬁnding should be acknowledged, however. First, there is only one observation 
period (1986-1990) before the Soviet collapse. Second, there are only 46 observations for the 
pre-collapse period, whereas there are more than 80 for each of the three subsequent periods (see 
Table II). 
 
While the collapse of the Soviet Union did not in itself appear to be a signiﬁcant supply shock 
for the small arms market, the role of the Soviet Union and its successor states as sources of 
weapons does yield signiﬁcant parameter estimates. Distance from Moscow is adopted as a 
proxy for the transport costs of getting weapons (in this case Kalashnikovs) from their initial 
source to the secondary markets on which they are traded. The distance from Moscow variable is 
positively correlated with weapon prices for all model speciﬁcations indicating that transport 




This paper has quantitatively investigated the nature of the small arms market. With the beneﬁt 
of newly compiled cross-country time-series data on the price of AK-47 assault riﬂes it has been 
possible to generate empirical ﬁndings on previously hypothesized aspects of the small arms 
market. 
 
The model developed to characterize the small arms market is theorized to be driven by four 
factors - income, motivation, regulation, and supply costs. Estimation of the reduced form 
version of the model ﬁnds that regulation and supply costs are signiﬁcant determinants of 
weapon price. This result is robust to various proxies for the concepts. The effective height of   17
trade barriers for weapons, both within and between countries is consistently signiﬁcant in 
weapon price determination. Surprisingly, when controlling for other factors, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union does not have as large an impact on weapon prices as is generally believed. The 
signiﬁcance of neighborhood effects, as proxied by neighbors’ military expenditure and an 
Africa dummy (as a residual measure of border porousness) indicates that regional trade is at 
least as important as global weapons trade. 
 
On the demand side, there is some evidence that, for a given level government effectiveness, 
increasing income raises the price of weapons as a wealth mark-up for a partially non-tradable 
good. Proxies for the motivation to acquire weapons: lagged income growth, homicide rate, and 
share of young men do not perform as well as expected. This may suggest that the historic focus 
on the supply side is justiﬁed. More likely, however, it indicates that better modeling and 
operationalization of the preferences for purchasing weapons is required. A further qualiﬁcation 
to the demand side results is that the price data collected are predominantly for the AK-47. By 
focusing on the AK-47, the most basic assault riﬂe, substitution effects are ignored if buyers 
substitute into other higher-grade weapon types 




The burgeoning ﬁeld of small arms research has produced a sizeable quantity of survey work. 
Compiling this growing wealth of survey information into a format amenable to statistical 
analysis has the potential to provide insights in addition to those garnered from close 
investigation of single cases. As the ﬁrst statistical analysis of small arms, this study has 





This study has begun the task of systematically collecting weapon price data and is intended to 
be an ongoing project. It is envisioned that the small arms research community will allocate   18
responsibility for collecting statistically useful data in the areas of weapon ﬂows, stockpiles, 
ammunition price, and border porousness. Collecting these data will be necessary in order to 




Cross-country, time-series data on weapon prices will also facilitate the testing of hypotheses on 
the relationship between small arms and civil conﬂict. For example, does the availability of small 
arms (as proxied by price) affect the probability of civil war onset? Does it lead to longer war? 
Does it result in higher conﬂict intensity in terms of battle deaths? Investigation of the role of 
weapons in civil war would seek to evaluate their differential impact on probability of conﬂict 
onset, conﬂict intensity, conﬂict duration, and post-conﬂict legacy. Empirical answers to these 
and other questions will be of direct relevance in generating constructive policy 
recommendations in relation to small arms policies and managing post-conflict societies.   19
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Appendix A: Data Collection Methodology 
 
In order to maintain consistency, the exact variable of interest is “the quoted or transacted price 
in $US for a non-government entity to take possession of an AK-47 assault riﬂe.” Data were 
sought for four ﬁve-year periods from 1986 to 2005. Each price observation is coded with the 
following details: 
 
• Price ($US) 
• Country 
• Time period (1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005) 
• The exact assault riﬂe type observed (e.g. AK-47, AK-74, craft replica) 
• The location where the price was quoted: (1) city, (2) province or (3) border 
• Whether the weapon was: (1) new, (2) used, or (3) in need of repair 
• The source of the price observation (e.g. URL link, reference to published document, name 
and/or affiliation of ﬁeld worker) 
 
 
   21









Table II: Global average Kalashnikov price 
 
 
Year Ending 1990 1995 2000 2005
All countries 448 425 559 534
Observations per period 46 82 106 101




Table III: Variables for Estimating Weapon Price Determinants 
 
Model Variable  Observed Variables 
Weapon price (P) AK-47 assault riﬂe price
Income (I)  Per capita GDP (PPP $US)
Motivation (M)  Lagged per capita GDP growth 
Civil war onset 
Young men share 
Underlying homicide rate
Regulation (R)  Government effectiveness 
Democratic accountability 
Law and order 
African continent
Supply cost (S)  Neighbors’ military expenditure
Own military expenditure 
Civil war legacy 
Post-Soviet collapse 
Distance from Moscow 
 
Region Min Max Average Std Dev Observations
Asia 40 6000 631 810 81
Africa and Middle East 12 3000 267 417 106
Eastern Europe and fmr Soviet States 50 3000 574 808 75
Americas 25 2400 442 437 59
Western Europe 225 1500 990 443 12
Total Observations 335
Total unique countries 117
Descriptive statistics: 1986-2005  22
Table IVa: Results of Weapon Price Regression 
12345678
GDP per capita PPP 2000$ 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]* [0.01]*
Neighbours' Military Expenditure -36.55 -29.71 -30.24 -31.87 -29.55 -28.32 -27.28 -31.75
[12.35]*** [12.54]** [10.81]*** [10.93]*** [9.01]*** [10.89]*** [12.98]** [13.55]**
Government Effectiveness 215.83 176.17 173.12 135.59 173.4
[59.62]*** [61.89]*** [60.67]*** [56.08]** [60.66]***
GDP per capita Growth, t-1 0.25 0.74
[2.86] [2.97]
Civil War Legacy -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05
[0.02]* [0.01]* [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.02]* [0.02]*
Africa Dummy -292.5 -293.87 -394.04 -356.95 -302.34 -332.79 -364.85
[122.54]** [120.93]**[120.78]***[113.85]*** [121.06]** [136.46]**[139.41]***
Ln Distance from Moscow 124.05 125.45 129.76 112.53 125.16 134.17 130.08
[62.66]** [61.54]** [64.20]** [53.57]** [61.52]** [68.80]* [71.45]*




Post-Soviet collapse period -41.42
[30.15]
Observations 222 212 228 228 265 228 187 187
Number of countries 85 81 81 81 94 81 69 69
R
2 0.08         0.18         0.17         0.18         0.10         0.17         0.18         0.11          
 
Table IVb: Results of Weapon Price Regression 
91 01 11 21 31 41 51 6
GDP per capita PPP 2000$ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]* [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Neighbours' Military Expenditure -33.16 -30.1 -34.78 -35.25 -35.46 -32.04 -32.16 -32.16
[12.56]*** [12.45]** [11.37]*** [10.96]*** [10.97]*** [10.90]*** [10.91]*** [10.91]***
Government Effectiveness 175.05
[66.64]***
Civil War Legacy -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
[0.02]* [0.02] [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]**
Africa Dummy -325.54 -378.19 -390.35 -331.24 -337.8 -337.8
[126.03]***[126.94]***[125.89]*** [126.47]***[126.95]***[126.95]***
Ln Distance from Moscow 132.02 125.18 90.47 70.81 72.3 120.79 123.66 123.66
[62.89]** [67.57]* [72.46] [64.19] [64.50] [64.06]* [64.27]* [64.27]*
Gov Effectiveness 33
rd-66




th percentile 307.48 230.83
[134.81]** [131.67]*
Gov Effectiveness 33








Observations 201 196 215 228 228 228 228 228
Number of countries 77 78 76 81 81 81 81 81
R
2
0.13         0.17         0.18         0.07         0.08         0.08         0.13         0.14          
 
Standard errors in brackets 
All regressions contain a constant 
* = significant at 10%, ** = significant at 5%, ***  = significant at 1% 
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Countries - civil war Countries - no civil war African countries
 